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I.

INTRODUCTION

The International Monetary Fund (the IMF or the Fund) was created to assist in stabilizing rates of currency exchange. Each country is
able to achieve stability only by balancing the amount of local currency
flowing out against the amount of foreign currency flowing in. When
exchange rates are stable, capital can flow more easily to places where it
can be most efficiently utilized, thus raising the worldwide level of
prosperity.
Unfortunately, the process of adjustment from imbalance to balance
entails some sacrifices. A country with an imbalance must eliminate the
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excess of imports over exports. The IMF has the power to use a carrotand-stick approach to convince member countries to endure the painful
transition. Generally, the Fund uses only the carrot by offering the prospect of large-scale, interest-free financing while the adjustment is underway. The Fund, of course, attaches strings, known as conditionality, to
the financing packages. Conditionality can be harmful both to the debtor
nations and to those nations' creditors.
This Note examines the ways in which the Fund uses conditionality to
improve a country's balance of payments. The Note then details objections that nations and individuals may have to conditionality and addresses the' range of possible responses to it. The Note concludes by arguing that resistance to conditionality fails to serve the long-term
interests both of those involved and of the world community as a whole.
II.

THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND

A.

History

In 1944 the multilateral Bretton Woods Agreement (the Agreement)
created an independent international organization known as the International Monetary Fund.' The creators of the Fund sought to address the
problems facing the international monetary system in the aftermath of
World War II. In reaction to these problems and the lingering problem
of unemployment,2 nearly every country took steps to defend its own
economy, and cutthroat competition became the rule.' Many countries
depreciated their currency, instituted multiple currency practices and enforced delays in current international payments to keep local products
competitive on the world market." As countries abandoned the gold standard, no automatic mechanism existed to keep currency values in balance. Furthermore, no worldwide mechanism existed to facilitate international currency returns.' Wide fluctuations in exchange rates

1. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, June 22, 1944, 60
Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501 (current version at 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937)
[hereinafter Articles of Agreement].
2. 1 J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 4
(1969). The depression of the 1930s had deflationary effects on exports around the
world, thus contributing to widespread unemployment.
3. Id. at 4-5.
4. Id.
5. The Bank for International Settlements, founded in 1930, 104 L.N.T.S. 441, reprinted in 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 323 (Supp. 1930), consists only of the central banks of
thirty European countries plus a small group of large United States banks. C. PARRY, J.
GRANT, A. PARRY & A. WATTs, ENCYCLOPAEDIC DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL
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encouraged speculation rather than productive investment, and as
World War II came to a close, economists feared another depression
similar to the one following World War I.7 Thus, hoping to avoid another round of destructive practices harmful both to international harmony and to individual economies, John Maynard Keynes and Harry
Dexter White devised the basic plan for an International Monetary
Fund.
At Bretton Woods, the parties to the Agreement discussed two approaches to accessing the Fund's resources. One approach, promoted by
the British delegation, favored advice and consultation by the Fund. The
British approach imposed no real limits on the right of a member to
draw on the Fund up to a ceiling of 25% of quota per year;' thus, a
member country could maintain an outstanding debit balance indefinitely.' Such a position was not unnatural for a nation battered by the
War and likely to be a debtor for some years to come. The United States
delegation, on the other hand, promoted a more authoritarian role for
the Fund. This second approach allowed members to make drawings
above quota only if the member adopted adjustment policies recommended by the Fund to eliminate the causes of the underlying imbalance.10 The United States approach also required repayment within a
stipulated time limit." Such a position was natural, coming from the
nation most likely to be a creditor in the foreseeable future.
The statement of purposes in article I of the Agreement reflects a
compromise" by "making the general resources of the Fund temporarily
available to [members] under adequate safeguards, thus providing them
with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international

LAw 39-40 (1986).
6. See Grilli, Buying and Selling Attacks on Fixed Exchange Rate Systems, 1986 J.
INT'L ECON. 143.
7. J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 2, at 6.
8. Keynes, Proposalsfor an International Clearing Union (British Government
White Paper Cmd. 6437, 1943), reprinted in 3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND 1945-1965, at 19 (J. Horsefield ed. 1969).
9. Id. at %6.
10. White, Preliminary Draft Proposalfor a United Nations Stabilization Fund
and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development of the United and Associated Nations
(1942), reprintedin 3 THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, supra note
8, at 37, 52.
11. Id.
12. See Young, Developing Plans for an International Monetary Fund and a
World Bank, 23 DEP'T ST. BULL. 778, 788 (1950).
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prosperity." 1 Although the solution to the tension between these two
views was a compromise at Bretton Woods, the tension continues to play
itself out in Fund policies.
B.

Legal Force of IMF Decisions

The Articles of Agreement, and article I in particular, form the basic
law of the Fund.14 The method for interpreting this basic, and somewhat
vague, law is important to resolving the American-British tension. First,
the Fund itself has the authority to make a binding interpretation of the
articles under article XXIX.1 Second, article XXVII gives those managing the Fund the power to suspend certain provisions of the Agreement, including article V, section 3, which governs members' rights to
draw on the Fund. Members cannot appeal these decisions to any authority other than the Fund except when withdrawing from the Fund or
when the Fund itself is in the process of liquidation. 6 Finally, the
Fund's management has legislative power in that it promulgates the
rules by which the members must abide."7
The IMF is independent of all governments and of all other international organizations."' The IMF does not belong to the United Nations
family of organizations, and it is not subject to the International Court of
Justice. 9 The legal limits on the Fund's discretion are enforceable only
by the Fund's governing body.20
Some national courts have upheld the Fund's power of interpretation;
other courts, however, have limited the power of interpretation. The
Federal Communications Commission (the FCC) was the first United
States tribunal to consider the effect of an official Fund interpretation on

13. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. I(v). Article V, section 3 provides the
basic procedures for access to the Fund's resources.
14. J. GOLD, THE RULE OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 5
(IMF Pamphlet Series No. 32, 1980). Article I states that the Agreement should be
interpreted in light of the article I purposes. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. I.
15. This was article XVIII prior to the First Amendment.
16. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXIX(c).
17. C. SCHREUER, DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS BEFORE DOMESTic COURTS 68 (1981).
18. See generally J. HORSEFIELD, INTRODUCTION TO THE FUND (IMF Pamphlet
Series No. 1, 2d ed. 1965).
19. See Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Monetary
Fund, April 15, 1948, art. 1(2), 16 U.N.T.S. 325.
20. See C. SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 136. The morality or desirability of the
Fund's being judge in its own cause is not at issue in this Note.
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United States domestic law. In All America Cables & Radio21 the FCC
examined whether the Fund could compel the United States government
to require a cable company to bill the Fund for official communications
at the company's most favorable rate. Article IX, section 7, provides that
Fund communications are to be given "the same treatment as the official
communications of other members." The IMF relied on the official article XXIX interpretation which states that "treatment" includes the rate
charged for communications, and further, that a government having regulatory power over rates cannot evade its obligation to see that Fund
messages receive the diplomatic rate.22 The FCC also had a State Department advisory opinion to the effect that the IMF ruling was indeed
binding on United States courts.23 The final ruling of the Commission
was a complete acceptance of the Fund's authority.2"
Courts and other agencies, however, have not always supported the
Agreement and its official interpretations. One key provision, article
VIII, section 2(b), provides that no member's courts shall enforce exchange contracts that violate the exchange controls of another member.2"
The official interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b) states that the
public policy of the forum state is not grounds for enforcing such contracts.2 6 Nonetheless, the New York Court of Appeals in Southwestern
Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank2 7 chose to enforce a contract that
was in violation of Italian exchange restrictions. The court stated: "In
our opinion it in no way affects the common-law rule of this State that a
depository of the proceeds of an illegal transaction cannot plead the illegality of the transaction as a bar to suit against it for breach of contract
and negligence." 2 The court was aware of the official interpretation,2 9

21. International Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. and Int'l Monetary Fund v. All
Am. Cables and Radio, Inc., 17 F.C.C. 450 (1953).
22. Decision No. 534-3 (February 20, 1959), reprinted in 10 SELECTED DECISIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 262 (1983)
[hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS].
23. Letter from Jack B. Tate, January 25, 1951, cited at 17 F.C.C. 450, 462 (1953).
24. For a fuller treatment of this case, see J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE
COURTs 20-26 (1962).
25. "Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member and which are
contrary to the exchange control regulations of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member."
Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. VIII, § 2(b).
26. Decision No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949), reprinted in SELECTED DECIsIONS, supra
note 22, at 233.
27. 6 N.Y.2d 454, 190 N.Y.S.2d 352, 160 N.E.2d 836 (1959).
28. Id. at 463, 190 N.Y.S.2d at 359, 160 N.E.2d at 841.
29. The official interpretation was cited by Justice Backer of the New York Supreme
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but nonetheless chose to enforce the contract.
Courts also have read the articles narrowly so as to promote the local
interests of the forum state. For example, in Wilson, Smithett & Cope,
Ltd. v. Terruzzi3 ° the English Court of Appeals limited the definition of
"exchange contracts" as used in article VIII, section 2(b) to contracts for
the simple exchange of currency for currency. Such an interpretation
plainly defeats the purpose of that article, which is to provide for the
enforcement of exchange regulations across international boundaries. By
limiting the meaning of "exchange contracts," the court "facilitate[s] and
promote[s] international trade,"'" particularly through London.3 2 England's public policy is to maintain London as one of the capitals of international trade and dispute settlement. 3 Thus, uniform enforcement of
contracts makes London more attractive to forum shoppers.
Any controversy concerning particular provisions notwithstanding, the
Fund has the power under the articles to bind the domestic courts of
member states by a sufficiently specific official interpretation.3 4 Courts
continue to have the option, however, to simply ignore the Agreement
and its interpretations altogether. In fact, courts use this technique with
considerable frequency. 5 For example, in Theye y Ajuria v. Pan American Life Ins. Co. 8 a Louisiana trial court enforced an insurance contract, the payment of which violated Cuban exchange controls. The in-

Court. Southwest Shipping Corp. v. National City Bank, 11 Misc. 2d 397, 410, 173
N.Y.S.2d 509, 522-23 (1958).
30. [1976] 1 Q.B. 683.
31. [1976] 1 Q.B. 683, 701 (Kerr, J. at trial level).
32. See 3 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 591-93 (1986).
33. See also Jugoslavenska Oceanska Plovidba v. Castle Inv. Co. [1973] 3 All E.R.
498, 504 (opinion of Roskill, L.J.) (English arbitrator's award in a foreign currency
must be enforced or "grave inconvenience will be caused to those who bring their disputes to this country for decision."). Similarly, the Second Circuit, enforcing a contract
that violated Costa Rican exchange controls, reasoned that "the United States has an
interest in maintaining New York's status as one of the foremost commercial centers in
the world." Allied Bank International v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d
516, 521 (2d Cir. 1985). Allied Bank was not an article VIII, section 2(b) case because
the Costa Rican controls violated article VIII, section 2(a), which bans controls limiting
payment on current transactions. The review assumed by a court over the consistency of
a foreign exchange regulation with the articles can mean the difference between a strong
IMF and a weak one as regards creditor nations.
34. See, e.g., International Bank for Reconstruction, 17 F.C.C. 450; United Kingdom
Bretton Woods Order in Council, S.R.& 0, 1946, No. 36. Article XX, section 2 requires
member states to take all necessary steps to enable themselves to meet their obligations
under the Articles.
35. C. SCHREUER, supra note 17, at 69.
36. 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964).
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termediate court of appeals, however, held the contract unenforceable,
citing the official interpretation of article VIII, section 2(b)"7 and refusing to apply its own public policy to Cuba's regulations. The Louisiana
Supreme Court reversed and applied Louisiana law to enforce the contract, without so much as a mention of the Fund's official
interpretation. 8
III.

IMF FUNDING FACILITIES

As the central organ of the plan to stabilize currencies, the Fund holds
balances of the currency of each member nation as well as significant
amounts of gold. The Fund effectively acts as a middleman for international payments by taking each country's foreign exchange earnings in
return for an equivalent amount of that country's own currency. In the
exchange process the Fund regulates exchange rates so as to achieve a
livable balance-of-payments position for each member. The Fund's supply of gold is available to even out short-term fluctuations in exchange
rates.3 9
In order to provide the currency and gold necessary to operate the
system, each country pays an assessed quota40 based on the size of its
economy upon admission to the Fund. Initially the Bretton Woods conferees determined each quota. A majority consisting of 85% of the Fund's
voting power now makes determinations regarding quotas. 4 ' Prior to
1979, each member country had to pay a minimum of 25% of the quota
in gold and the remainder in the member's own currency.4 2 After 1979,
member countries replaced the payments in gold with payments in the
currencies of other members.43 The Fund uses these resources to facilitate current international payments as well as to assist countries with
balance-of-payments problems to make necessary adjustments in their economic policies and deficit financing.
The Fund, rather than actually making loans, allows members to use
37. 154 So. 2d 450, 453 (La. 1963).
38. 245 La. 755, 161 So. 2d 70 (1964).
39.

The "par value" system of fluctuating currencies maintained within a specified

range was part of the original articles. 2 M. DE VRIES & J. HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965, at 39-43 (1969). This system was abandoned
in favor of freely floating currencies in the Second Amendment of the articles in 1979.
40. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. III.
41. Id. art. XII, § 5.
42. 60 Stat. 1401, 1403 (1945) (art. III, § 3(b)).
43. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. III, § 3(a). Payment can also be made
with Special Drawing Rights, an IMF-created unit, discussed infra at notes 96-100. See
generally J. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 13, 1969).
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their own currency to purchase currencies of other members."" If all
members' accounts were in balance, the Fund would hold exactly 100%
of each member's quota in that member's currency. As the balance of
payments fluctuates members may require more foreign exchange than
they currently hold. The primary source of exchange for those needs is
the reserve tranche. The reserve tranche consists of the difference, if any,
between the member's quota and the amount of that member's currency
presently held by the Fund.' 5 Thus, a member's reserve tranche upon
becoming a member of the Fund would be 25% of quota, representing
the amount paid in the currencies of other members.4" The Fund attaches no special conditions to the use of the reserve tranche and treats
the funds as part of the foreign exchange assets of the member.4" Members, therefore, are free to use the reserve tranche as if they hold the
funds directly.4 8
When a member seeks to make purchases of other members' currencies in excess of the reserve tranche, the purchases begin to resemble
loans. In order to preserve the revolving character of the resources, the
Fund wants the use of its resources to be temporary. When a member's
payments are out of balance, the Fund holds large amounts of that member's currency with no offsetting demand for that currency elsewhere. To
ensure that funds continue to revolve, the IMF requires that members
repurchase drawings.49 To help ensure repurchase, article V, section
3(a) authorizes the Fund to
adopt policies on the use of its general resources, including policies on
stand-by or similar arrangements, and [it] may adopt special policies for
special balance of payments problems, that will assist members to solve
their balance of payments problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Agreement and that will establish adequate safeguards for the
temporary use of the general resources of the Fund.50

44. See Gold, Use of the InternationalMonetary Fund's Resources: "Conditionality" and "Unconditionality" as Legal Categories, 6 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 7 (1971).
45. J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BY THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND:
LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 27, 2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE].

46. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
47. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. V, § 3(b), (c).
48. Members may use the credit tranches and other financing facilities without first
using their reserve tranche. See generally J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note
45, at 27.
49. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. V, § 7(b).
50. See also id. art. I(v) ("making the general resources of the Fund temporarily
available to them under adequate safeguards").
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Credit tranches provide the basic facilities for the IMF to extend assistance. Four tranches, each equal to 25% of quota, are available for
drawings by members. Full use of the first credit tranche raises the
Fund's holdings of that member's currency to 125% of quota. In order to
access the first credit tranche the member must convince the IMF that it
is taking measures to resolve any existing payment imbalance. 5 ' The
Fund, however, will not make specific demands concerning particular
macroeconomic indicators that affect the balance of payments and will
not set specific dates for repurchase."2
The three upper credit tranches are more difficult to access. A member
must show a "substantial justification" of a need for the resources. 53 In
effect, the member must be pursuing a program to deal with its payments imbalance that meets with IMF approval.54 Since a single drawing ordinarily will not cure a serious payments imbalance, the Fund allows members to enter into "standby" arrangements,5 5 whereby the
Fund permits upper-tranche purchases at stated intervals if the member
adjusts its economic policies in cooperation With the Fund to cure the
underlying causes of the imbalance. In upper-tranche drawings, standby
arrangements are the rule rather than the exception.5 6 A standby arrangement is the result of consultations and negotiations between representatives of the Fund and of the member. 57 A Letter of Intent, resulting
from the consultations and negotiations, sets out policies for the member
government to follow and usually includes certain macroeconomic
targets, known as performance criteria, which the Fund expects the

51. Annual Report of the Executive Directors 31 (1962), reprinted in SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 22, 26.
52. Decision No. 6056-(79/38) (March 2, 1979), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS,

supra note 22, at 20.

53. IMF Annual Report, supra note 51.
54. Decision No. 270-(53/95) (Dec. 23, 1953), as amended by Decision Nos. 876(59/15) (April 27, 1959) and 1151-(61/6) (Feb. 20, 1961), reprinted in SELECTED DE-

supra note 22, at 46.
See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XXX(b); J.

CISIONS,

55.

GOLD, ORDER IN IN-

TERNATIONAL FINANCE, THE PROMOTION OF THE IMF STAND-BY
AND THE DRAFTING OF PRIVATE LOAN AGREEMENTS 5

ARRANGEMENTS

(IMF Pamphlet Series No. 39,

1982).
56. J. GOLD,

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 10; M. GUITIAN, FUND
CONDITIONALITY: EVOLUTION OF PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 14 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 38, 1981) (hereinafter M. GUITIAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES). See gener-

ally Gold, The Growing Role of the IMF's Stand-By Arrangements, 1984 J. Bus. L. 308

(1984).
57. J. GOLD,

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE,

supra note 45, at 13.
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member to meet."' Furthermore, the Fund conditions continued drawings under the standby on the member's success in meeting the performance criteria. 9
In theory, the criteria for determining appropriate conditions are the
same for each of the three upper credit tranches. ° As a practical matter,
however, conditions become more stringent as the amount to be drawn
increases. This occurs simply because the need for a large drawing indicates a significant imbalance and requires more drastic measures for
6
cure.
Although the Fund offers the credit tranches as the principal form of
financing, the Fund also makes other facilities available to members independently of drawings in the reserve and credit tranches. These facilities include the Compensatory Financing facility, the Buffer Stock Financing facility and the Temporary Oil facility of the mid-1970s.
The purpose of the Compensatory Financing facility is to aid countries experiencing sudden drops in national income due to a collapse in
the prices of its export products. The Fund primarily intends the facility
to benefit countries that depend on a single export, usually agricultural,
for the majority of their foreign exchange earnings. The Fund attaches
relatively mild conditions to drawings up to 100% of quota. 2 The member, however, must agree to "cooperate with the Fund in an effort to
find, where required, appropriate solutions for its balance of payments
difficulties."'6 3
A complementary facility, the Buffer Stock facility, compensates members for contributions made to international arrangements designed to
stabilize the price of primary commodities. Drawings are available under
the facility if the international arrangement receives Fund approval. 4
The prior approval fills the function of conditionality in this facility. 5 In

58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 20-21.
Cf.Guitifn, Fund Conditionality and the International Adjustment Process:
The Early Period, 1950-70, 17 FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1980, at 23, 25-26.
62. The actual amount that can be drawn may decrease depending on the historical
trend of prices for the particular commodity. J. GOLD., FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra
note 45, at 29-30.
63. Decision No. 6224-(79/135) (Aug. 2, 1979), reprintedin SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 22, at 61.
64. Decision No. 2772-(69/47) (June 25, 1969), as amended by Decision No. 4913(75/207) (Dec. 24, 1975), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 22, at 70.
65. J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 30.
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the past, the Fund has approved arrangements for tin, 6 sugar, 7 and
rubber.6 8 The Fund limits drawings under the Buffer Stock facility to
50% of quota.6 "
Another related facility, the Temporary Oil facility, opened in response to the sudden rapid rise of oil prices in the mid-1970s and the
resulting disastrous effects on many economies. The Oil facility, similar
to the Compensatory and Buffer Stock facilities, was premised on the
notion that the imbalances involved were temporary and were caused by
circumstances beyond the member's control. The Oil facility, therefore,
imposed minimal conditions on drawings up to 75% of quota. In addition, a member using the Oil facility had to refrain from imposing new
exchange restrictions without prior Fund approval and had to develop a
0
program to deal with imbalances resulting from increased energy costs.7
Unlike the other facilities, however, the Oil facility was financed with
money borrowed by the Fund, and interest was charged on drawings. 1
Members had to complete repurchases within seven years. 2
Facilities not requiring major policy changes generally resolve payments imbalances that are by nature temporary. Some imbalances, however, are structural, and simple financing will not cure the causes of the
imbalance.73 The basic tranche policies provide for purchases bringing
Fund holdings of a member's currency to 200% of quota.7 4 The ordinary
duration of a standby arrangement is one year" and is renewable as
necessary. 6 For most imbalances, even structural imbalances, the basic
tranche policy provides sufficient financing to allow time for the member
to change policy as necessary to bring external accounts into balance. In
some cases, however, a member may require more exchange over a

66.
SIONS,

67.
SIONS,

68.
SIONS,

Decision No. 7247-(82/147) (Nov. 12, 1982), reprinted in SELECTED DECIsupra note 22, at 74.
Decision No. 5597-(77/171) (Dec. 16, 1977), reprinted in SELECTED DECIsupra note 22, at 75.
Decision No. 7246-(82/147) (Nov. 12, 1982), reprinted in SELECTED DECIsupra note 22, at 78.

69.

Decision No. 2772-(69/47), supra note 64.

70.

J. GOLD,

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 31.

71. Id. The Fund charged interest of 67/8 percent to 71 percent on outstanding
balances.
72. Id. The facility operated from June 1974 to March 1976.
73. Decision No. 4377-(74/114) (Sept. 13, 1974), as amended by Decision Nos.
6339-(79/179) (Dec. 3, 1979) and 6830-(81/165) (Apr. 22, 1981), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 22, at 27.

74. See supra text accompanying notes 44-61.
75. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 21.
76. J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45,

at 16.
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longer period of time. More assurance of a flow of foreign exchange may
be necessary, therefore, to "give confidence to members" 77 and to put the
member in a position to balance the accounts.
The Extended Fund facility, created in 1974, 8 allows for the Fund's
holdings of a member's currency to rise as high as 265% of quota, with
members completing repurchase within ten years for drawings made
over the course of three years.7 9 The goal of the Extended Fund facility
is a long-term adjustment in a structural balance of payments deficit.
Thus, conditionality is high. The Fund and the member negotiate performance criteria and policy changes just as they negotiate for uppertranche purchases. In practice, however, conditionality may be stricter
than that applied to normal tranche purchases because the need for more
funds indicates more serious structural problems."
The Supplementary Financing facility fulfills a function similar to
that of the Extended Fund facility. The Supplementary Financing facility is available only to members whose needs exceed the amounts available under the tranche policies and who require more time than is otherwise available in Fund programs. Limits on drawings in this facility are
not necessarily expressed in terms of quota; rather it is an open-ended
source of financing."1 As a prerequisite to drawings on the facility, the
member must have a standby arrangement in the upper credit tranches.
Conditionality is applied at that stage. The Fund has assurance from
experience with the earlier standby that the member will honor the
terms of the Letter of Intent.
The Enlarged Access policy82 provides for the lifting of drawing limits, in terms of quota, under a standby or extended arrangement on an
adequate showing that the member truly needs the resources. Conditionality on Enlarged Access funds is of the highest magnitude, requiring a
showing that "the member's program will be adequate for the solution of
its problem."8 In legal theory this standard is not significantly different

77.
78.

Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. I(v).
Decision No. 4377-(74/114), supra note 73, at 27.

79. J. GOLD,

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE,

supra note 45, at 33.

80. "The inevitable determinant of the severity of a program ... is the intensity of
a member's problem. Conditionality should be regarded as harsh only if it were to go
beyond what was necessary to overcome a problem. .. " J. GOLD, FINANCIAL AssisTANCE, supra note 45, at 21.
81. Cf. Decision No. 5509-(77/127) (Aug. 29, 1977), reprintedin SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 22, at 33.
82. Decision No. 6783-(81/40) (Mar. 11, 1981), reprintedin SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 22, at 40.
83. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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from the standard of conditionality that the Fund imposes in the upper
credit tranches 8 4 In reality, however, the higher the drawing, the more
stringent the conditions.
One facility, the Trust Fund, was fundamentally different from the
others in that the funds provided were true loans; no exchange of currency was made at the time of the drawing. 5 Moneys for the Trust
Fund came not from quota subscriptions, but from Fund sales of gold, or
from loans to the Fund from other members."' In order to gain access to
the Trust Fund, the country had to accept a high-conditionality adjustof 1% on
ment program. The Fund charged interest at the rate of
loans, which the country was obligated to repay within ten years. The
Trust Fund was terminated as of April 30, 1981.87
On March 27, 1986, the Fund announced the creation of a new financing facility, the Structural Adjustment facility. 8 The purpose of the
facility is to assist the poorest developing nations with their long-term
adjustments. Funds are available to countries on terms similar to those
under the Trust Fund. The Structural Adjustment facility is funded by
repayments of Trust Fund loans.8 9 Borrowers have a five year grace period, and must repay thereafter within an additional five years.90 On
July 24, 1987, the Fund, responding to the financial crises of less developed nations, raised the limit on these loans from 47% of quota to 63.5%
of quota. 1
In order to limit the benefits of competitive devaluation to debtor nations and to protect these debtor nations from currency fluctuations beyond their control, repurchase requirements and drawing limits under
standby and extended arrangements are expressed in Special Drawing
Rights (SDRs).92 The SDR was developed as part of the First Amendment of the Articles of Agreement in 1968 to increase the supply of in-

84. But cf. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 21, 1 4, 6.
85. J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 36; Decision No. 5069-(76/

72) (May 5, 1976), reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 22, at 302.
86. J. GOLD, FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE, supra note 45, at 36.
Decision No. 6704-(81/185) (Dec. 17, 1980), reprinted in

87.
SIONS,

SELECTED DECI-

supra note 22, at 318, 319.

88. Fund Board Creates New Facility to Assist Low-Income Countries, 15 IMF
97 (1986).
89. Id. at 108-09.
90. Id. at 109.

SURVEY

91. 16 IMF

SURVEY

225 (1987).

92. See, e.g., Form of Stand-By Arrangement Under Enlarged Access Program, in
J. GOLD,

ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE,

supra note 55, app. at 43.
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ternational liquidity.93 A member holding an SDR may purchase an
equivalent amount of its own currency from another member or may
obtain other currencies from the Fund for the purpose of balancing international accounts."4 The Fund originally expressed the value of the
SDR in terms of a weight of gold,95 but now determines the value by a
formula using a "basket" of major currencies."
IV.

CONDITIONALITY POLICIES

The official Fund policy on conditionality is quite vague. Whatever
guidelines exist concerning conditionality are found in the Executive
Board decision of March 2, 1979, wherein the Board states:
In helping members to devise adjustment programs, the Fund will pay
due regard to the domestic social and political objectives, the economic
priorities, and the circumstances of members, including the causes of their
9
balance of payments problems. 7

Although such vagueness is not unreasonable in light of the extremely
wide range of circumstances to which Fund conditionality programs
must apply,98 a justifiable concern exists that conditionality be imposed
evenhandedly. 99 Official Fund policy is to balance the need for flexibility
with the need for uniformity of treatment. 00
After considering the actual content of conditionality programs, one
commentator has identified two stereotypes. 101 One sterotype portrays
the Fund as unilaterally imposing more or less the same package on all
comers--a Procrustean bed in which the main feature is a strict austerity
program to reduce aggregate domestic demand. 10 2 The other stereotype
93. See J. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS 14-15 (IMF Pamphlet Series No. 13,
2d ed. 1969).
94. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XIX.
95. This was article XXI prior to the Second Amendment, 20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S.
6748 (1968).
96. Beginning January 1, 1986 the SDR is valued at the sum of US $ 0.452, DM
0.527, 33.4, F. 1.02 and £0.0893. Press Release 85/44 (Dec. 31, 1985), reprinted in
15 IMF SURVEY 14 (1986). The IMF SURVEY publishes a daily quotation for the SDR
in each of 46 currencies in each bi-weekly issue.
97. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 20, 1 4.
98. de Larosire, Resolution of Debt Difficulties Requires Adjustment, Financing,
12 IMF SURVEY 139 (1983).

99. Gold, Political Considerations are ProhibitedBy Articles of Agreement When
the Fund Considers Requests for Use of Resources, 12 IMF SURVEY 146, 147 (1983).
100. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 20, 8.
101. Bruno, Comments, in IMF CONDITIONALITY 125 (J. Williamson ed. 1983).
102. See generally Dell, Stabilization: The Political Economy of Overkill, in IMF
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portrays a flexible Fund, responding instantly to changing circumstances,
with no preconceived notions about which policies are necessary to fix a
particular payments imbalance.1 03
The Fund has changed its policies over time. The 1979 guidelines
explicitly recognize the importance of members' political situations in designing adjustment programs. 0 4 In addition, the basic duration for
standby arrangements has increased from six months to one year, and
new facilities (the Supplementary and Extended Fund facilities) provide
additional long-term assistance. Although in 1981 the Fund purportedly
shifted its emphasis from demand-management policies to export-stimulus supply side programs,10 5 the IMF still refuses to allow "the prevalence of political weakness

. .

.[to] be accepted as a justification for fail-

ure to take the necessary economic actions." 10 6 Regardless of the cause of
a payments imbalance, the member experiencing the outflow is the country that must practice austerity, 0 7 and demand management is still the
main focus of adjustment.1 8
The official IMF policy on adjustment methods requires that the
Fund consult with members to set macroeconomic goals but allow the
member government to choose the particular policies necessary to achieve
these goals.1 09 Performance criteria generally reflect the goals set by the
Fund. 1 0 Criteria typically required for continued drawings under a
standby or extended arrangement include limits on expansion of domestic credit; limits on government borrowing; limits on, and occasionally
requirements of, further international commercial borrowing; and the re-

supra note 101, at 17, 21-22.
103. See generally Dale, Financing and Adjustment of Payments Imbalances, in
IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 3, 9-11; Kincaid, Conditionality and the Use
of Fund Resources: Jamaica, FIN. & DEv., June 1981, at 18. The truth lies somewhere
in between.
104. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 21, 4.
105. Guiti~n, Fund Conditionality and the International Adjustment Process: A
Look into the 1980s, FIN. & DEv., June 1981, at 14.
CONDITIONALITY,

106. Finch, Adjustment Policies and Conditionality, in IMF

CONDITIONALITY,

supra note 101, at 75, 79.
107. Guitiin, supra note 105.
108. Id.; see also de Larosiire, supra note 98.
109. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 22-23,
9, 10; see also de
Larosi re, J. de Larosihre Urges Officials to Learn From Recent Experience, 14 IMF
SURVEY

210 (1985).

110. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52. Performance criteria are to be "general in character and few in number." Crockett, Issues in the Use of Fund Resources,
FIN. & DEv., June 1982, at 10, 15.
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tention of-minimum levels of foreign exchange reserves."1 Ordinarily a
non-quantifiable requirement exists that no new restrictions on current
international payments be imposed. 112 In addition, the Fund has an historical concern for inflation as well as for stagnation.113 IMF-supported
adjustment programs, therefore, typically include measures designed to
reduce government deficits and to moderate the rise of wages and
prices. 14
In the past, and still in large part today, the IMF adjustment strategy
relies primarily on demand-management techniques to reduce consumption of imports.1 5 The primary tools in demand-management strategy
include money-supply policies, fiscal restraints, the devaluation of currency to make imports more expensive, the tightening of domestic bank
credit to both the public and private sectors, and pricing policies "to prevent an undesired pattern of resource use resulting from an unrestricted
play of market forces."1 1 6 Moreover, restrictions on government spending
can help reduce aggregate demand. When combined with an exchange
devaluation, these restrictions function as a check on the overall money
117
supply.
In 1981 the Fund began emphasizing new measures designed to affect
the supply side of the balance of payments equation, 1 8 the idea being to
reallocate the country's resources in order to maximize productive investment, particularly in the export sector. 1 9 The World Bank, whose primary role is to finance particular development projects, is a natural partner in the effort to maximize productive investment.2 2 Pricing policy
also affects the supply side of the equation because where imported
goods become more expensive, domestically produced substitute goods be-

Williamson, The Lending Policies of the International Monetary Fund, in
IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 605, 634.
111.

112.

Id.

Heller, Impact of Inflation on Fiscal Policy inDeveloping Countries, 27 IMF
712, 740 (1980).
114. See, e.g., Conklin & Davidson, The I.M.F. and Economic and Social Human
113.

STAFF PAPERS

Rights: A Case Study of Argentina, 1958-1985, 8 HuM. RTs. Q. 227, 249-50, 254
(1986).
115. M. GUITIAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 56, at 5; see also Guitign, supra note 105, at 15; Lichtensztejn, IMF - Developing Countries: Conditionality
and Strategy, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 209.
116. Crockett, supra note 110, at 13.
117. M. GUITIAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 56, at 6-7.
118. Guitign, supra note 105, at 15.
119. Crockett, supra note 110, at 14.

120. Gold, The Relationship Between the InternationalMonetary Fund and the
World Bank, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499 (1982).
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come more attractive. 12 ' Furthermore, when domestic production for export relies on imported raw materials, the member can ease import restrictions on those materials. 1 2 2 Another new measure is to increase the
circulation of domestic capital and also to23attract investment of foreign
capital by raising domestic interest rates.'
Adjustments in the exchange rate affect both sides of the equation. As
the effective price of imports rises, the demand for imports should drop,
and as the real price of exports decreases, the demand for these goods
should increase. The resulting difference between the lower prices of domestic goods and the higher costs of imported goods will encourage import substitutes. The control of exchange rates is a key factor in almost
every IM-F-approved adjustment package.124 The devaluation of exchange rates, however, does have drawbacks. For example, the prices of
imports rise, and foreign creditors who have made loans or long-term
contracts expressed in local currency become very upset. As an alternative to exchange devaluation, the government may impose a collection of
quotas, tariffs, subsidies and licenses in order to produce similar effects
on relative prices. 20
V.

A.

DEBTOR NATIONS AND THE FUND

Debtor Objections to Conditionality Policies

Debtor nations doubtless would like to be free from payments imbalances. Imbalances drain the country of money and either force the issuance of more money (with attendant inflation) or create a recession as
the result of a lack of capital. Inflation and a shortage of national income
make commercial lenders unwilling to lend, or willing to lend only at
very high rates of interest.' 2 6 Banks typically make loans to countries
with payments imbalances in "hard" currency; thus repayment obligations will cause a further drain on foreign exchange resources.
Although imbalances cause many problems, governments have many
concerns other than balanced international accounts. Governments have

121. Crockett, supra note 110, at 13.
122. Id.
123. M. GurriAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTIcES, supra note 56, at 12.
124. Crockett, supra note 110, at 14.
125. Id. These measures will, however, increase government expenditure and will
effectively restrict free trade. Although the IMF retains these measures in its programs,
the measures are retained only out of consideration for political realities.
126. de Larosi~re, supra note 98, at 139.
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an overriding interest in political stability. 2 7 Economic prosperity, characterized by full employment, rising real incomes, equitable distribution
of national income, and international creditworthiness, greatly enhances
political stability.' 2 8 Failure to achieve economic prosperity in these areas may lead to the downfall of governments, either in democratic or
nondemocratic political contexts.129 In order to adjust the balance of payments the debtor will suffer pain. As a Managing Director of the Fund
once observed:
It is very clear that, given the magnitude of the external financing imbalances in a difficult world economic environment, the task of adjustment
facing many members entails great sacrifices. In these circumstances, it is
sometimes asked if the Fund's conditionality is not too onerous and demanding on borrowing countries or even if the Fund's policies are not
aggravating the recession. But the truth of the matter is that a country
facing balance of payments difficulties has no choice but to adjust.13 °
The human cost of adjustment, however, may be higher than any nation
is willing to pay. Although demand management is beneficial, limits exist as to the elasticity of demand, particularly the demand for food.
The Fund applies various demand-management policies. One policy is
to devaluate currency without increasing the money supply, thus raising
the price of goods, particularly imports, to the whole population.13 Another policy of the Fund is to discourage subsidies. The Fund believes
'
that prices, especially energy prices, should not be "distorted" 132
because
as formerly controlled prices rise to world levels, consumption patterns
must change.1 3 Furthermore, tight controls on domestic credit reduce
127. See, e.g., Fund's Central Role is Stressed, With Need for Due Conditionality,
12 IMF SURVEY 325, 331 (1983) (remarks of Mr. Mundia, spokesman for African
member countries).
128. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, at art. I(ii); U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
129. The state of the economy always bears on an incumbent's chances of reelection.
Often it is a key issue in an election campaign. The Jamaican elections of October 1980
were known as "the IMF general elections." The incumbent lost. Sharpely, Economic
Management and IMF Conditionality in Jamaica, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra
note 101, at 233, 257. A good non-democratic example is the veritable parade of Argentine governments described in Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 230-44.
130. de Larosi~re, supra note 98, at 139.
131. Cline, Economic Stabilization in Developing Countries: Theory and Stylized
Facts, in IMF CONDITIONALrrY, supra note 101, at 175, 182.
132. M. GUITIAN, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES, supra note 56, at 13.
133. It must be admitted that change in patterns of consumption is precisely the
point, but it must also be admitted that the change is a painful one, borne most heavily
by those who can least afford it. See generally Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at
248-57.
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opportunities for creating jobs because domestic employers cannot expand when credit is not available.'" Another Fund policy reduces government outlays which in turn reduces government employment, which
may often comprise a substantial part of a nation's economy. Furthermore, decreases in government spending eliminate programs essential to
the long-term economic and social well-being of the country, including
such items as education and public health projects.' 8
Measures designed to enhance the supply side also impose significant
costs. First, subsidies and special treatment of particular industries only
benefit those holding an equity interest in the profits produced by those
industries. Thus, the owners of the means of production, rather than the
workers, enjoy the benefits of increased exports. Employees suffer further because the country imposes wage controls to lower the cost of labor
in comparison to the world market, thus making the export goods more
salable."' Second, easing the restrictions on imported goods used in export production can undercut a domestic industry producing substitutes
for those goods. 13 7 Countries can ameliorate this undesired effect only by
equalizing prices by imposing tariffs on the imported materials, thus defeating the purpose of making them more readily available, or by subsidizing the substitute materials, which increases the government deficit.
Last, by increasing domestic real interest rates countries may encourage
reinvestment of domestic capital. This approach, however, has several
drawbacks. The increase in interest rates can encourage speculation
rather than true productive investment1" 8 and can encourage actual decapitalization if an existing business is less profitable than the offered
interest rate."" Another drawback is that the decreased spread between
interest charged on loans and interest paid on deposits can lead to bank
failures.1 4 ° In response, banks may charge higher interest rates on loans,
thereby exacerbating the problems of tight domestic credit. When banks
charge high interest rates on loans, businesses may have to operate without sufficient capital and thus be more likely to fail.

134.

Id. On the other hand, some evidence exists showing that employment levels

tend to rise as the real value of wages drops. Johnson & Salop, Stabilization Programs
and Income Distribution, FIN. & DEv., Dec. 1980, at 28.
135. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 251-52.
136. Guitin, supra note 105, at 14.
137. See Crockett, supra note 110, at 13.
138. Feinberg, The InternationalMonetary Fund and Basic Needs: The Impact of
Stand-By Arrangements, in

HUMAN RIGHTS AND BAsic NEEDS IN THE AMERICAS

222 (M. Crahan ed. 1982).
139. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 252-53.
140. Johnson & Salop, supra note 134, at 28-29.

215,
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Exchange devaluation serves as an across-the-board cut in real incomes. Companies operating in the export sector can take advantage of
the devaluation by paying employees in devalued local currency while
selling the goods at world prices for hard currency.141Meanwhile, everyone
else, particularly those on fixed incomes, suffers.
The effect of these measures, both individually and collectively, is to
lower the standard of living for the vast majority of people, thus widening the gap between rich and poor.1 42 It matters not at all to the IMF
whether the imbalance was caused by some fault of the debtor nation or
by external factors. Rather, the Fund is concerned with whether the imbalance is temporary or persistent.1 43 The Fund never attempts to stimulate foreign demand for a debtor's exports, nor does the Fund attempt to
cure the external causes of an imbalance. Thus when a nation suffers
from an imbalance caused by external factors, the imposition of conditionality often harms innocent victims. In addition to causing painful adjustments, the IMF is always in more of a hurry to meet economic
targets than a politician could ever be. 4 Ordinarily standby arrangements last only one year.1 4 5 However, checks on performance criteria are
made even sooner. For example, the 1985 standby arrangement with Argentina, agreed to in December 1984,46 called for a reduction in the rate
of inflation from 400 percent per year to 150 percent per year by the end
of 1985. When Argentina failed to meet the interim target for February
147
1985, the Fund cut off drawings under the standby.
The reality of the Fund setting goals, while allowing the government
to choose the means of achieving those goals, is subject to serious question. The Argentine experience provides an illustration. The first Argentine conditionality package in 1958 required the government to eliminate
price controls and subsidies and to impose wage controls."" 8 As recently
as the 1985 standby, the Fund required increases in the fees charged by
the Argentine government for government services.1 4 9 Other debtor countries have had similar experiences. In the 1980 extended arrangement

141.

Johnson & Salop, DistributionalAspects of Stabilization Programs, 27 IMF

STAFF PAPERS 1, 13 (1980).

142. Id.
143. Dell, supra note 102, at 21-22.
144. See Communiqu of Group of 24, 14 IMF SURVEY 311, 313 (1985).
145. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 21.
146. Press Release No. 84/43 (Dec. 28, 1984), 14 IMF SURVEY 14 (1985).
147. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 242-43.
148. Id. at 230.
149. Id. at 243. The Fund has gone so far into microeconomic control as to require
higher bus fares. Id. at 259 (quoting Feinberg, supra note 138, at 219).
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with Kenya, the Fund imposed a particular import policy as a performance criterion.""0 The 1978 standby with Portugal required increases in
the controlled prices of particular items. 5 1 Between 1968 and 1978 no
fewer than seven programs required specific revenue or expenditure
152
measures as performance criteria.
B.

Compromise Between the Fund and Debtor Nations

Although countries often endure great hardships, the Fund and its
conditionality are nonetheless important to debtor nations. A standby arrangement has a catalytic effect on commercial lending to the debtor.
The IMF "seal of approval" can improve the debtor's status.1 53 Indeed,
bank financing is generally of greater magnitude than IMF direct financing.1 54 Likewise, the availability of foreign exchange in the proper
currencies is essential to the survival of the debtor nation because commercial lending might not provide the varieties of currency necessary to
meet international obligations. Perhaps the most important function of
IMF conditionality is that the government may blame the IMF when
introducing painful but necessary adjustment measures.1 55 Adjustment
measures, although quite burdensome regardless of who imposes those
measures, are the means necessary to cure payments imbalances. The
Fund has the power to completely cut off an uncooperative member
country.1 56 Therefore, members have strong incentives to reach a settlement with the Fund.
The Fund also has a strong interest in reaching an agreement.1 "' The
principal reason for the Fund's creation was to stabilize exchange rates.
The Fund, however, cannot achieve that goal if currencies must be con-

150.

Killick, Kenya, the IMF, and the Unsuccessful Questfor Stabilization, in IMF
supra note 101, at 381, 402.

CONDITIONALITY,

151. da Silva Lopes, IMF Conditionality: The Stand-By Arrangement with Portugal, 1978, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 475, 483.
152. Beveridge & Kelly, Fiscal Content of FinancialProgramsSupported by StandBy Arrangements in the Upper Credit Tranches, 1969-78, 27 IMF STAFF PAPERS 205,
222 (1980).
153. Dale, The IMF's Role in a Changing World, 21 FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1984, at
2, 13.
154. de Larosire, supra note 98, at 140-42.

155.

Matthews, Global Economy, Debt Crisis Top Agenda at IMF Meeting, AM.
cf. Crockett, supra note 110, at 15.

BANKER, Sept. 26, 1986, at 2;

156. Article V, section 5 gives the Fund the power to cut off a member from all
access to Fund resources.
157. Dale, supra note 103, at 16.
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stantly devalued to keep pace with payments imbalances. ' " The safeguarding of the international monetary system also requires avoidance of
a debtor's revolt. The default of major sovereign debtors could weaken
commercial banking so greatly as to destroy the entire system."' An additional motivation for reaching an agreement on conditionality is the
interest in safeguarding the revolving character of the Fund's assets.
Debtor economies drained of foreign exchange earnings may be unable
to make repurchases, thus leaving the Fund holding large amounts of
useless currency. 6 0
These competing interests provide debtors and the Fund with reasons
to agree and to disagree. The resulting compromises can be anomalous.
Many programs actually mandate increased inflation, at least in the
short term.1 61 Despite the Fund's history and despite article VIII, section
3, the Fund has allowed actual multiple currency practices to continue in
Uruguay and Jamaica. 6 2 Although such practices may continue with
Fund approval, the article also states that multiple currency practices
shall be removed unless maintained under article XIV, section 2, a special dispensation for the immediate post-World War II period. In 1982,
1 3
thirty-six IMF members were engaged in multiple currency practices. ,
Contrary to the goals stated in article I(ii)"" and the consideration of
social and political objectives as promised in the 1979 conditionality
guidelines,"6 ' fund-supported programs have in fact made the poor of
many nations poorer while increasing the wealth of the wealthy.1 66 Although it is true that the Fund is not technically subject to the United
Nations Charter,1 67 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 68 or

158.

Cf Friedman, PrivateBank Conditionality:Comparison with the IMF and the

World Bank, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 109, 115.
159. Hall, How Safe Are Banks?, FIN. WORLD; Nov. 13, 1985, at 10.
160. Friedman, supra note 158, at 115; Finch, supra note 106, at 81.
161. Finch, supra note 106, at 82-83.
162. Concerning Uruguay, see 2 J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS
104-07 (1982); Energetic Worsted Corp. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 606, 608 (Cust.
Ct. 1963). Concerning Jamaica, see Sharpley, supra note 129, at 258.
163. R. EDWARDS, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATION 388 (1985).
164. One of the purposes of the Fund is "to contribute . . . to the promotion and
maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the
productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy." (emphasis
added).
165. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 21.
166. Killick, Bird, Sharpley & Sutton, IMF Policies In Developing Countries: The
Case for Change, THE BANKER, April 1984, at 31; Johnson & Salop, supra note 134.
167. June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 933 (1945).
168. Adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1978).
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the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,'6 9
the Fund has supported adjustment programs massively violating each of
170
these.
The Fund professes to be politically neutral.' 7 ' In practice, however,
the Fund is unable to achieve neutrality. Although the Fund calls its
approach "pragmatic,"'7 2 the Prime Minister of Greece considered a
proposed Fund conditionality package a call to abandon Socialist principles. 73 Measures tending to widen the gap between rich and poor do not
contribute to the creation of a classless society. Since almost every policy
tool used in IMF programs widens the gap, the Prime Minister's argument has considerable justification. 7
The converse of the Prime Minister's criticism is also true. IMF policies can appear to be in opposition to the free market. The hallmark of
adjustment programs is artificial limitation, specifically, artificial limits
on public and private credit, artificial disincentives on imports, artificial
reordering of industrial production into exports, and artificial decreases
in the purchasing power and bargaining power of workers. None of
these limitations are compatible with laissez-faire political economy. The
Fund, however, cannot achieve macroeconomic change without impacting upon the political economy. At the opening meeting of the IMF,
Lord Keynes expressed a fear that the Fund would become a politician,
making determinations not for their own sake or on their own merits,
but because of something else.'17 That fate seems to be inevitable.

169.

G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/

6316 (1966).
170. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 248.
171. Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 20, 22; Gold, Political Considerations Are Prohibited, supra note 99, at 146.
172. Financingand Adjustment Should Work in Tandem, According to Fund Policy, 13 IMF SURVEY SUPPLEMENT ON THE FUND 2 (1984).
173. Greece Attacks IMF, EC Stand on Resources, J. COMM., Mar. 19, 1984, at
23B, col. 1.
174. Greece has not used any tranche program since a reserve tranche drawing in
1975. Drawings have been made, with timely repurchase, from the Oil facility and the
Compensatory Financing facility.
175. 1 J. HORSEFIELD, supra note 2, at 123. Lord Keynes said, speaking as the evil
fairy Carabosse, "You two brats [the Bretton Woods twins] shall grow up politicians;
your every thought and act shall have an arrire-pensge;everything you determine shall
not be for its own sake or on its own merits but because of something else." Id.
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CREDITOR NATIONS AND THE FUND

Creditor Objections to Conditionality Policies

Because the world financial system is extremely interdependent, parties other than the member subject to conditionality have an interest in
the transaction. First, creditor nations, and more specifically the banks in
those creditor nations, have an interest in the economic well-being of the
debtor nation.17 The Fund conducts regular and intensive reviews of
economic conditions in all member countries,17 7 thus creating an important informational resource for commercial lenders. 7 1 In making lending
decisions, banks, therefore, rely on the IMF's evaluation of a potential
borrower. By providing such information, the Fund acts as a catalyst for
1 79
private lending.
The Fund is more able to demand policy changes than are the
banks. '80 Banks compete with one another to make profitable loans;'"
therefore, their bargaining power decreases accordingly. The Fund, on
the other hand, plays a key role in determining which loans the bankers
will compete to make. Borrowers, therefore, have to please the Fund
more than they have to please any particular commercial lender. Furthermore, the Fund, as a non-profit organization, has an additional air
of authority. Although the Fund's cash contribution generally is less than
the aggregate commercial lending to a debtor nation, it is significant
compared to the lending of any particular commercial source."8 2 Armed
with large financial resources combined with supervisory ability and
backed by the commercial lenders, the Fund effectively can create, impose and supervise adjustment programs in a manner not available to the
banks.

176. See Mikesell, Appraising IMF Conditionality. Too Loose, Too Tight, or Just
Right?, in IMF CONDITIONALITY, supra note 101, at 47.
177. See Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § 8; art. VIII, § 5; see also
Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 20, 1 5; Dale, supra note 103, at 6. A
great deal of information given to the Fund is not available to the public, even if the
public were willing to make an effort to find out.
178. J. GOLD, ORDER IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, supra note 45, at 14-15;
Schulman, PrivateBanks Urge Debtors and Creditors to Intensify Efforts to Solve Debt
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179. de Larosire, supra note 98, at 140; Robichek, The InternationalMonetary
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Second, creditors have a strong interest in the adjustment of imbalances because if no money exists to repay debts already owed, major
defaults are inevitable. The significant amount of outstanding loans justifies the banks' fear of defaults by sovereign borrowers. By 1981, commercial banks were making new loans of up to $40 billion per year to
the non-oil developing countries.1 8 3 The United States government,
therefore, is validly concerned that a default by a foreign sovereign could
threaten the United States economy. 8 The threats of default on current
loans require banks to keep lending in order to enable the debtor to
maintain payments. 185 Thus, a captive lender is unable to exert any
pressure for policy change in the debtor countries; rather, only an independent source like the IMF can exert such pressure. Although the
banks depend on the IMF to strengthen the debtor country, the banks do
not want the Fund to impose too stringent conditionality. A debtor's revolt in response to restrictive policies could quickly result in disaster.
Creditors are justified in fearing a debtor's revolt. Cuba has been urging
the Third World to throw off its "shackles of debt."1 ' In addition, debtors nations are rumbling about the possibility of suspending interest
1 87
payments.
Last, creditor nations are interested in the content of conditionality
programs under article VIII, section 2(b). 8 8 This section prescribes nonenforcement of contracts violating the exchange controls of any Fund
member imposed consistently with the Articles of Agreement. Exchange
controls imposed as part of an IMF-approved adjustment program are
binding on the rest of the world. Thus the courts of any IMF member
country could not enforce a contract using a rate of exchange that differs
from the rate that the IMF has imposed. Regulations favoring the debtor
nation will conversely disfavor parties dealing with the debtor. For example, an artificial exchange rate could impose great costs on a contracting party. Creditor nations are concerned that the Fund, as part of
its program, place no debilitating restraints on their nations' trade with
debtor nations. The policy of the Fund is to keep trade as free as possi-

183.

World Debt Situation, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy

of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982) (statement of Mr.
Clark).

184. Id. at 1.
185.
186.
187.
J., Feb.
188.

Robichek, supra note 179, at 145.
Fidel Stirs Another Pot, NEWSWEEK, July 29, 1985, at 53.
See Cohen & Truell, Brazil Hardens Its Position on Paying Debt, WALL ST.
26, 1987, at 25.
See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
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ble"'" and the Articles expressly prohibit restrictions on current payments except with Fund approval. 190 Many IMF programs, however,
retain restrictions on current payments. The Fund will not instantly dismantle a control regime that the debtor has established. To the extent
that a debtor nation maintains controls, they have the Fund imprimatur,
and creditors cannot avoid the application of article VIII, section 2(b).
B.

Compromise Between the Fund and Creditor Nations

The Fund lacks the money necessary to finance large adjustment programs without relying on outside resources.19 x Thus, the Fund must consider the interests of the creditors. Austerity programs require time to
achieve the goals set by the Fund. Even assuming that the adjustment
program is successful, a structural imbalance may take considerable time
to resolve. Because the debtor must continue to make payments during
the recovery, additional financing is the carrot to accompany the conditionality stick.19 2 These interests are more realistic than the lofty goals of
the Fund.1" 3
In a more direct sense the Fund must respect the interests of creditor
nations because of the weighted voting system used to govern the Fund.
The Executive Directors manage the Fund19 4 and make the decisions
regarding conditionality packages.1 95 The five nations having the largest
quotas directly appoint at least five of the Executive Directors. 98 The
voting power of the Executive Directors is proportionate to the voting
power of the members who elect them.197 The Board of Governors, consisting of one person appointed by each member nation,"9 8 can review
decisions made by the Executive Board.' Votes of the Board of Cover-

189. Finch, supra note 106, at 81.
190. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. VIII, § 2(a).
191. Dale, supra note 103, at 8-9.

192. de Larosire, Managing Director Charts Course for Sustainable Economic
Growth, 13 IMF SURVEY 217 (1984).
193. Friedman, supra note 158, at 115, 118.
194. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § 3(a).
195. E.g., Decision No. 6056-(79/38), supra note 52, at 22, 1 7.
196. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § 3(b)(i). Fifteen are elected by
all other members. Id. at art. XII, § 3(b)(ii).
197. Id. art. XII, § 3(h)(iii); J. GOLD, VOTING MAJORITIES IN THE FUND: EFFECTS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT OF THE ARTICLES 2-3 (IMF Pamphlet Series No.
20, 1977).
198. Articles of Agreement, supra note 1, art. XII, § 2.
199. Id.
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nors, however, are also weighted according to quota.20 0 Although the
Governors generally do not review Executive decisions, the check still
exists. Absent concerted efforts to organize the low-quota members, the
high-quota members will continue to dominate both governing bodies.2 01
The Fund is caught between the interests of the creditors and the interests of the debtors, yet it must formulate programs acceptable to
both.20 2 Because the Fund needs outside financial support to effect longterm structural adjustments, the Fund has in fact required commercial
lenders to advance additional credit to a country as a precondition to the
conclusion of a standby agreement with that country. Such was the case
with Mexico in 1982203 and Argentina in 1984.20 Banks generally respond to the Fund's exertion of power because so much money is at risk.
As one United States banker said, "[I]t's amazing to see the lack of influ'20 5
ence the major banks have in these things.
As a result of political and economic reality the Fund may allow a
country to maintain currency restrictions or rates of exchange that creditors dislike. One outstanding example is Jamaica's de facto dual currency system.20 6 When a currency is overvalued, as often happens, a foreigner using the official rate of exchange gets a worse deal than would be
available in a free market. Article VIII, section 2(b) enforces that
disadvantage.
VII.

POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO CONDITIONALITY

A.

Debtors' Responses

The above discussion enumerated some of the frictions that arise between the Fund and its members. The following section will discuss how
the parties address those frictions and what options are available to
member nations.
Creditors have little direct say in the formulation of particular adjust200.
400,000
required
201.
GOLD,

202.

Id. Art. XII, § 5. Each Governor has 250 votes plus one vote for each SDR
of quota. Id. art. XII, § 5(a). A sidelight is that the Fund's main office is
to be in the territory of the member with the largest quota. Id. art. XIII, § 1.
In 1977, developing countries had a combined voting power of 32.9 percent. J.
VOTING MAJORITIES, supra note 197, at 6.
See Robichek, supra note 179, at 146.

203. IMF Orders Banks to Keep Mexico Afloat, Bus. WK., Dec. 6, 1982, at 34;
Robichek, supra note 179, at 148.
204.

IMF Pressesfor Accord on Argentine Loan, J. of Comm., Nov. 9, 1984, at 5A;

Robicheck, supra note 179, at 148.
205. IMF Orders Banks to Keep Mexico Afloat, supra note 203.
206. Sharpley, supra note 129, at 258.

692

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[Vol. 20.665

ment programs. Creditors' interests are represented in the Group of Ten
nations lending money to the IMF under the General Arrangements to
Borrow20 7 and in the Group of Seven industrial nations.208 Although
these two groups consult regularly with Fund management, they have no
voice in the structuring of particular programs.
Debtor nations generally must also accept the programs as created by
the IMF. Debtors have a consultative group, the Group of Twenty-four,
which urges lower conditionality and higher volumes of financing on
Fund management.2 09 A typical pattern of conduct for debtors with intractable structural imbalances is to:
(1) avoid the Fund as long as possible (thereby exacerbating the
210
problem);
(2) conclude as mild a conditionality package as the Fund will
approve;
(3) make one or two drawings under the standby;
(4) miss the performance criteria, thus cutting off further drawings
under the standby; and
(5) repeat steps two through four.
Jamaica's experience with the Fund provides one example of this cycle.
In August 1977 Jamaica reached a two-year standby agreement. This
agreement, however, was suspended in December of the same year. The
parties agreed to an extended arrangement, scheduled to last three years,
in May 1978. The second arrangement similarly was suspended in December 1979. After the parties failed to reach an agreement in 1980, a
new extended arrangement became effective in April 1981.211 Standbys
of 1986 and 1987 have also been effected.2 12 The Argentine experience is
largely parallel. Standby arrangements for three consecutive years beginning in 1983 were cut off prematurely. A new standby has replaced the
21 4
1985 version as well. 213 A 1987 standby has also been put into effect.

See, e.g., Group of Ten Communique, 12 IMF SURVEY 294 (1983).
208. See, e.g., Ministers Cite Need to Redress Imbalances by Intensifying Their Cooperative Efforts, 15 IMF SURVEY 314 (1986) (statement of Finance Ministers of the
207.

Group of Seven).

209. Deputies of Intergovernmental Group of 24 Callfor Major Changes in Monetary System, 14 IMF SURvEY 2, 11 16, 24-37 (Supp. on Group of 24 Deputies' Report

1985).
210. See Fund and Banks to Play Key Adjustment Role, According to Participants
in Joint Seminar, 13 IMF SURVEY 204, 204 (1984).
211. Sharpley, supra note 129, at 240.
212. Press Release No. 87/4, 15 IMF SURVEY 79 (1987) (announcing 1987 standby
and compensatory financing).
213. Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 239-44.
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By stringing the Fund along in this way, whether intentional or not, a
debtor nation may obtain IMF resources while keeping austerity programs at a level sufficiently moderate to maintain political stability. A
second option available to debtors simply is to not deal with the IMF at
all, but to approach commercial creditors directly. Chile,21 5 Venezuela, 218 and Argentina 217 have taken this approach. The potential success of this strategy, however, is limited by the commercial banks' willingness to lend absent IMF approval. After all, even with IMF
approval, Jamaica was unable to get the commercial financing it
needed.21 8 Without approval from the IMF, lenders will be much more
hesitant to make loans to debtor nations. Furthermore, rejection of an
IMF program indicates the debtor's unwillingness to bite the bullet in
order to meet obligations, which bodes ill for repayment of new loans.2 1 9
A third possible solution for debtors would be to introduce an entirely
new currency. The Fund, of course, prohibits multiple currency practices, 220 but the replacing of an old currency with a new one allows the
debtor to set an entirely new exchange rate. Bolivia recently used this
technique 22' as part of a stabilization program and not to defraud creditors. Any benefit from such a strategy would necessarily be short-lived,
but could help lighten the load of old debt. Furthermore, payment of an
old obligation in new currency at rates not inconsistent with the Articles
would receive support from article VIII, section 2(b). In the long run,
however, a structural imbalance will reassert itself. A misvalued new
currency is no better than a misvalued old currency.
Last, the most obvious and most destructive option is a debtor's revolt.
Cuba, under the direction of Fidel Castro, has been urging other debtor
nations to take this option.2 22 Such an action would not only be disastrous for creditors, the Fund, and the world financial system as a whole,
214. Press Release No. 87/23, 16 IMF

SURVEY

233 (1987).

215. O'Reilly, Chile Aets to Discard Agreement With IMF, J. Comm., Apr. 3, 1984,
at IA.

216. O'Reilly, Venezuela Reaches Debt Accord: Nation Not Required to Submit to
Program Sponsored by IMF, J. Comm., June 25, 1985, at IA.
217. See Conklin & Davidson, supra note 114, at 239 (no standby from 1979
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218. Sharpley, supra note 129, at 256.
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but would be equally disastrous for the defaulting debtor who is not
completely self-sufficient. The market for the currency of a willfully defaulting debtor would instantly disappear.22 s In addition, the need for
foreign exchange for current transactions would be greatly intensified.
The effects of a payment imbalance, which would presumably continue
to exist, would be felt directly and immediately in the absence of credit
to soften and postpone the blow. The threat of a debtor's revolt is much
more useful to the debtor than an actual default would be. As long as a
creditor has a hope of repayment there is the possibility that the creditor
will be willing to throw good money after bad. Indeed, we have seen that
224
banks feel that they have no choice but to do so.
B.

Creditors' Responses

Creditors have more realistic options available to them. Working
within the Fund structure, creditor nations can use their superior voting
power. As of December 31, 1986, 31 countries had standby or extended
arrangements in place.2 25 Their total proportion of quota is 8.76 percent.226 On the other hand, the Group of Seven countries has a total of
48.96% of quota.227 An exertion of political muscle could easily put control of the Fund's policies squarely with the creditor nations.
The creditors may avoid further losses by refusing to supply any more
money to the Fund. This possibility exists because article II, section 2
says, "No quota shall be changed without the consent of a member concerned." In addition, the Group of Ten also has the power to unilaterally withdraw from the General Arrangements to Borrow. 2
Commercial creditors who are willing to make unified demands and to
carefully supervise the borrowers can force a debtor to accept any conditions. The Fund is more a convenience to the banks than it is a necessity.

223. Fidel Stirs Another Pot, supra note 186.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84. But see Fraust & Sudo, Loan-loss
JuggernautRolls On; New Reserves Vary Among Biggest Banks, AM. BANKER, June 3,
1987, at 4 (trend toward increasing bad debt reserves).
225. Fund Credit Outstanding Stackers in 1986, New Fund Loan Commitments
Continue Rising, 16 IMF SURVEY 45, 46 (1987).
226. See 14 IMF SURVEY 7 (Supp. on the Fund 1985) (Fund quotas); see also 16
IMF SURVEY 46 (1987) (stand-by, extended and structural adjustment facility (SAR)
arrangements as of December 31, 1986).
227. 15 IMF SURVEY 263 (1985). Voting power is somewhat less because of each
member's automatic 250 votes. See supra note 204.
228. M. AINLEY, THE GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS TO BORRow 22 (IMF Pamphlet
Series No. 41, 1984).
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Private conditionality is common with domestic loans.2 29 No apparent
reason exists that creditors cannot impose conditions similar to those for
domestic loans for international loans.
Making conditionality more stringent may not be advisable. The
Fund's reasons for negotiating with debtors apply with equal force to
commercial lenders. The Fund's already pro-creditor approach 30 is an
indication that stricter conditionality might be counterproductive. If the
idea of forcing tighter conditions is abandoned, the main problem creditors have with Fund conditionality is article VIII, section 2(b). There is
little a creditor nation can do to help its bankers and businesspeople.
Article VIII, section 2(b) can simply be ignored by the courts. One
scholar has noted: "The considerable number of judgments in which
courts simply ignored it, especially those cases in which the outcome is in
clear contradiction to its terms ... must be taken as an indication of the
limited degree of authority attributed to it by domestic courts. 2 31 Indeed, most judges are blissfully unaware of the existence of that section
unless it is brought to their attention by the parties to a dispute. Even if
made aware of it, courts have the freedom to interpret it out of existence,
as did the courts in Terruzzi23 2 and Theye y Ajuria.233 Without article
VIII, section 2(b) businesspeople are free to make contracts without fear
of intervening exchange depreciation or other restriction.
Short of actually abandoning article VIII, section 2(b), courts could
choose to apply it only if the foreign regulations involved accord with the
court's notions of fair play and justice or with the court's view of the
forum state's national interest. United States precedent for such an approach can be found in the Supreme Court's decision in Columbia v.
Cauca Co. 234 There the Court assumed de novo review over an arbitral
award made by an international panel and determined the appropriate
award on the merits.
In the same way the courts could, if they wished, review approved
exchange controls as an "award" of the IMF to see if they should be
enforced. The national interest of the forum state has been a factor in
the recognition or nonrecognition of foreign awards. For instance, in
23 5
Sapphire InternationalPetroleumsLtd. v. National IranianOil Co.
229.
230.
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the Iranian court overturned the decision of a Swiss arbitrator because
Iranian law had not been applied. The contract in issue had no choice of
law clause, but the Iranian court held that the application of any other
law was error. In that manner, exchange contracts can be reviewed for
violations of the forum's public policy rather than the public policy of
the state whose currency is involved as expressed in that country's exchange regulations. The public policy of the United States and of the
United Kingdom is to maintain New York and London as centers of
world trade, places where businesspeople can rely on their contracts being enforced.2" 6
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although options do exist for the aggrieved, the world financial system
would be harmed by all of them, and in the long run resistance to IMF
conditionality is almost surely counterproductive. The Fund is the organ
of international cooperation and compromise. It is as close to an international omnilateral consensus-builder as there is. Resistance to the Fund
is therefore resistance to international compromise.
The introduction of multiple currencies, or predatory devaluation of
currency is a benefit only so long as other nations restrained by a sense
of fair play or by the Agreement do not do likewise. As soon as a state is
harmed by such a predatory practice, it has ever stronger incentive to
defend itself. Self-defense for a competitive exporter may mean institution of similar measures in competition. For a creditor state, it may
mean refusal to enforce currency restrictions in the courts, thereby making them meaningless. These sorts of measures not only create economic
confusion but also create genuine political animosity.
Further, resistance to Fund-selected adjustment techniques cannot
solve the underlying problem of a debtor nation. The value of imports
will continue to exceed the value of exports until something is done
about it. Rejecting Fund adjustment simply puts the burden on the government, which may very well not have the political strength to effect the
needed changes. The Fund's role as a scapegoat is not to be
underestimated.
The Bretton Woods conference was held primarily to stop the thencurrent "beggar my neighbor" policies. The Fund has in large part accomplished that end. Resistance to Fund policies implies an effort to secure an unfair advantage in improving the balance of payments. Any
improvement in a country's balance of payments, which is not based on
236. See supra note 33.
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the real relative value of its imports and exports, must necessarily come
at someone else's expense. An attempt to evade that fact invites all the
problems that led to the institution of the Fund in the first place.
No one wants to see a return to the "beggar my neighbor" policies of
the 1930s. The Fund represents international cooperation and compromise. It is no wonder that the Fund is not well-liked, because the Fund
must force compromise on members. Nonetheless, compromise is essential to cooperation. Any weakening of the mechanism for that compromise only makes the underlying debtor-creditor friction more direct.
Brian Trubitt

